Title
Conservation needs exposed by variability in common-pool governance principles
Author(s)
McClanahan, T. R.;Abunge, C. A.
Published
2019
Publisher
Conservation Biology
Published Version DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13258
Abstract
Common-pool governance principles are becoming increasingly important tools for natural resource management with communities and comanagement arrangements. Effectiveness of these principles depends on variability in agreements, trust, and adherence to institutional norms. We evaluated heterogeneity in governance principles by asking 449 people in 30 fishing communities in 4 East African countries to rate their effectiveness. The influences of individuals, their membership and role in stakeholder community groups, leadership, community, and country were tested. The membership and role of people were not the main influence on their perceptions of the effectiveness of governance principles. Therefore, drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of specific principles would be difficult to make independent of the individuals asked. More critical were individuals' nationalities and their associations with the shared perceptions of a response-group's effectiveness of each principle. Perceptions of effectiveness differed strongly by country, and respondents from poor nations (Madagascar and Mozambique) were more cohesiveness but had fewer and weaker between-community conflict-resolution mechanisms. Overall, group identity, group autonomy, decision-making process, and conflict resolution principles were perceived to be most effective and likely to be enforced by repeated low-cost intragroup activities. Graduated sanctions, cost-benefit sharing, and monitoring resource users, fisheries, and ecology were the least scaled principles and less affordable via local control. We suggest these 2 groups of principles form independently and, as economies develop and natural resources become limiting, sustainability increasingly depends on the later principles. Therefore, management effectiveness in resource-limited situations depends on distributing power, skills, and costs beyond fishing communities to insure conservation needs are met.
Keywords
common property;coral reefs;decentralization;democracy;fisheries;management;Indian Ocean;Ostrom principles;polycentric governance;arrecifes de coral;descentralizacion;democracia;gobernanza;policentrica;manejo de pesquerias;Oceano indico;principios de Ostrom;propiedad comun;(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic);(sic);(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic);(sic)(sic);(sic)(sic)(sic);(sic)(sic);(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic);(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic);collective action;sustainable governance;resource-management;communication;comanagement;institutions;fisheries;Biodiversity & Conservation;Environmental Sciences & Ecology

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PUB24838